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This paper discusses the reasoning behind the exchange rate policies set out in the 
Maastricht Treaty of the European Union. The question of the appropriate exchange rate 
policies for new member states of the EU should be seen from the wider perspective of 
Economic and Monetary Union, and the creation of a single market. Four basic 
arguments are made in defence of the current exchange rate framework: (i) it is argued 
that exchange rate stability, per se, may be desirable if that is seen from the broader 
perspective of European integration, (ii) exchange rate stability is vital for countries 
attempting to lock permanently their exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro at a given parity, 
(iii) exchange rate stability prevents unilateral changes in the exchange rate that may 
delay partner countries’ convergence relative to the Maastricht criteria, and finally (iv) a 
period of “internship” inside the Exchange Rate Mechanism ensures that countries begin 
adjusting their behaviour/policies to the requirements of a common currency area. 
A necessary condition for stability inside the ERM II is that countries maintain prudent, 
particularly fiscal, policies and proceed with structural reforms that enhance the 
flexibility of the economy. The analysis is a one-sided defence of limited exchange rate 
flexibility under the “current circumstances”: i.e., the process of convergence in terms of 
the Maastricht criteria and the final adoption of the euro.  




Economic policy coordination lies at the heart of monetary unification in the European 
Union. Monetary union itself is considered a cornerstone to the more ambitious project, 
namely that of the creation of a common market in Europe. The establishment of a 
common market for goods and services within Europe must therefore be seen as the 
ultimate objective, and in this context free trade for goods and services, the adoption of a 
single currency, and enhanced policy coordination, are merely the foundations for 
achieving the ultimate, grand goal.  
 
At the core of policy coordination in the EU is the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which sets 
out the formal framework for coordination of exchange rate policies.  The ERM was 
formed in 1979 as an attempt to create a zone of exchange rate stability and enhanced 
policy coordination, which would prove essential prior to the introduction of a single 
currency in Europe. The ERM went through different phases since 1979, and the ERM II 
was set up in the 1990s  in the run-up to the introduction of the euro to cope with the 
convergence of countries that did not (yet) join the euro area.  The basic difference 
between the original system and the ERM II is that the latter is centered around the euro, 
rather than the ECU, while the official fluctuation bands are also considerably wider (see 
Box 1). 
 
In addition to enhancing exchange rate stability in Europe, the ERM served an another 
valuable role during the high inflation years throughout the 1980s by providing a nominal 
anchor for countries and thereby strengthening their disinflation efforts.  Overall, it is fair 
to say that the system was successful, especially after the turbulent first years after its 
inception, in pinning down inflationary expectations and creating a zone of exchange rate 
stability. Views of course differ and the topic has been extensively debated (see Giavazzi 
and Giovannini, 1989, and De Grauwe and Papademos, 1990, and references therein.) 
After the dramatic exit of the United Kingdom from the ERM in 1992—and the shift in  
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many countries to inflation targeting regimes,—and as a result of receding inflationary 
pressures in most ERM countries, the focus shifted toward more exchange rate flexibility 
(for a post-1992 discussion see Artis and Lewis, 1993, for example.) This is to be 
explained, to some extent, by the fact that inflation rates had come down considerably, 
thus providing room for exchange rates to adjust prior to the commencement of the third 
stage of EMU. The ERM II was seen as providing room for more flexibility, while at the 
same time continuing to shield countries from myopic exchange rate policies and, more 
importantly, large swings in exchange rates driven by speculative flows. 
 
The current position of the EU is that participation in the ERM II “…will help to ensure 
that Member States that are outside the euro-area participating in the mechanism orient 
their policies to stability, foster convergence and thereby help them in the their efforts to 
adopt the euro…” 
2 More importantly, the Council’s decision of June 1997, on the 
establishment of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the third stage of EMU, states 
that “the single market must not be endangered by real exchange rate misalignments, or 
by excessive nominal exchange-rate fluctuations…” 
 
Exchange rate stability is therefore seen as important both in terms of achieving, and 
facilitating, a single European market, but is also regarded as an important test for 
participation in the euro zone. Countries must learn to live in an environment of exchange 
rate discipline and refrain from pursuing “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies that can slow 
down other countries’ convergence, and hence delay adoption of the euro. The Treaty 
states explicitly that “Member states shall regard their economic policies as a matter of 
common concern and shall coordinate them within the Council…” (Article 99 EC 
Treaty). 
 
Implicit in these statements is also the opinion that sizeable changes in the value of the 
exchange rate of one country that are not supported by economic fundamentals (i.e., the 
emergence of speculative bubbles) are likely, and should be prevented in the run-up to 
the adoption of the euro. Hence, the ERM II can be thought of as an insurance policy for 
                                                 
2 European Council, 16 June 1997.  
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countries wishing to join the euro zone at a desirable exchange rate parity. It is argued 
that participation in the ERM II may provide considerable exchange rate stability, 
especially given the provision for unlimited intervention at the margin by the ECB and 
the country in question.  
 
In this paper we review the rationale behind the requirement that countries should 
participate in the ERM II for a period of, at least, two years prior to them adopting the 
euro. The analysis focuses on the 10 new members of the EU only, purely as the case for 
these countries joining the ERM II will become more pressing soon. We ask whether 
exchange rate stability, per se, is good and whether the participation in the exchange rate 
system should instead be seen as a learning period before the irrevocable fixing of 
exchange rates, and/or as a protection shield against irrational bubbles and speculative 
attacks. We also show that exchange rate flexibility, and in particular unilateral exchange 
rate actions by a country, or a group of countries, may interfere with other countries’ 
chances of meeting the Maastricht criteria. Needless to say that the ERM II is only a 
small, albeit important component, of the much broader policy coordination apparatus of 
the EU and it should also be interpreted along these lines. 
 
Although we recognize that there are risks when adopting a fixed exchange rate we 
consider that these risks have diminished considerably, particularly as has become clear 
that these countries’ ultimate goal is the adoption of the euro. We further argue that these 
countries have also been exposed to sizeable capital flows during their recent histories, 
and have coped relatively well in terms of their policies. In addition, recent institutional 
changes (e.g., the establishment of independent central banks, the commitment to sound 
fiscal policies in the context of EU fiscal policy coordination) should also contribute to 
more macroeconomic stability and hence contribute to exchange rate stability inside the 
ERM II.   
 
Needless to say that the success of this strategy rests on the commitment by countries to 
maintain prudent policies, and carry on with their structural reform programs. But it 
should also be noted that “participation in ERM-II should help achieve real and nominal  
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convergence, and should not be seen as a mere waiting room for the adoption of the euro” 
(Economic and Financial Committee, 2003). However, once it is deemed that enough 
progress has been achieved with regard to macroeconomic policies—particular fiscal 
consolidation—and structural reforms, participation in the ERM II will serve as a vehicle 
for preparing, and a criterion for readiness, for the adoption of the euro. Experience 
suggests that under such conditions exchange rate variability could decline significantly, 
facilitating greatly the adoption of the euro. Hence, participation in ERM II should not be 
considered as an ad hoc test for exchange rate stability, but instead should be seen as an 
opportunity to achieve meaningful macroeconomic, and policy, convergence prior to the 
adoption of the euro, prepare for the single monetary policy framework, and create 
conditions that are conducive to trade creation and growth inside the European Union. 
 
  




Box 1: The Exchange Rate Mechanism II 
 
(Statement by European Council, November 2000, See European Commission,  2001) 
 
•   Prior to accession, there are no formal restrictions on the choice of an exchange rate regime, 
with the exception of euroisation, which is explicitly prohibited. 
•   Upon accession, new Member states shall treat their exchange rate policy as a matter of 
common concern. 
•   After accession, although not necessarily immediately, accession countries are expected to 
join the ERM II. 
 
Key Features of the ERM II 
 
•   Stable but adjustable central rates to the euro. 
•   Fluctuation bands of ±15 percent around central rate, although on a case-by-case basis, 
formally agreed fluctuation bands narrower than the standard one and backed up by official 
intervention and financing, may be set up. 
•   A new Member State may join ERM II, upon request, at any time after accession, subject to 
the agreement on the central parity and size of fluctuation bands. 
•   However, the ECB may decide to suspend interventions if it is deemed that these actions 
interfere with the primary objective of price stability. 
 
Adoption of the Euro 
 
•   “The criterion on participation in the exchange rate mechanism …shall mean that a Member 
State has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for the by the European 
Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the 
examination.” 
•   In particular, the “Exchange rate to have been maintained within a fluctuation band of 
±2.25% around the currency’s central parity against the euro in the context of the ERM II. 
However, to the extent to which a breach of the ±2.25% fluctuation band would correspond to 
severe tensions would take into account of a range of relevant considerations. A distinction is 
to be made between exchange rate movements above the 2.25% upper margin and movements 
below the 2.25% lower margin.” (Annex D.3, European Commission, 2000, 2002e)   
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Exchange Rate Stability is Good Anyway 
 
Is exchange rate stability the ultimate objective of policy makers, or, is it simply viewed 
as an intermediate target?  In this section we discuss to what extent exchange rate 
stability, per se, is good. We look at this question from two angles. Firstly, from the 
wider perspective of the establishment of a common market. Secondly, from the point of 
view of macroeconomic stability. 
 
From a broader standpoint, exchange rate stability is desirable for the smooth functioning 
and deepening of a single European market (e.g., free movement of goods).  Recent 
evidence confirms that exchange rate uncertainty can have a negative impact on 
international trade, and particularly trade among European countries (for example 
Dell’Ariccia, 1999, and references therein). This empirical evidence suggests that a total 
elimination of exchange rate uncertainty should boost bilateral trade, on average, by some 
3-4 percent.
3 Such an improvement is in addition to the direct positive effects that EU 
membership also brings to intra-EU trade. These positive effects on trade, albeit rather 
small, are still non-negligible and should be of considerable concern to policy makers.  
 
Sizeable exchange rate fluctuations may be associated with excessive inflation 
variability. This is especially true for small, open economies. Inflation variability can be 
undesirable if it leads to greater variability of relative prices, which may prevent the 
smooth functioning of the price mechanism (see Driffill, et al, 1990, on the debate 
regarding the costs of inflation). More inflation variability is also often associated with 
more inflation uncertainty and in some cases can be the cause of higher inflation. Figure 
1 shows that, al least for the ten countries in question, there appears to be a striking 
correlation between exchange rate variability and inflation variability.
4  
                                                 
3 Rose (2000) also showed that lower exchange rate volatility does increase trade, but the effect of a 
common currency is significantly stronger (see Rose, 2000, 2001, and more references therein). 
4 Bordo and Schartz (1999) recently have analyzed the performance of several indicators across different 
monetary policy regimes. In their words “An important distinction between a convertible or fixed anchor 
regime (or even one dedicated to price stability) compared to an inconvertible regime (or one following an 
inflation target) is lower long-run price uncertainty.”  
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Exchange rate stability might discipline policymakers into following more prudent fiscal 
policies. In a small open economy an expansionary fiscal policy is usually mirrored by a 
widening current account deficit that, sooner or later, puts pressure on the exchange rate. 
There are two channels through which fiscal policy affects the exchange rate. First, the 
direct import effect whereby government purchases increase imports directly. This is 
certainly the case in most of these, relatively small, economies and should be expected to 
put a downward pressure on the exchange rate. The second is the exchange rate channel 
according to which a budget deficit leads to a reduction in aggregate savings relative to 
investment demand, a rise in the real interest rate, and consequently capital inflows and 
exchange rate appreciation (see Krugman, 1995, and Branson 1985, for example). A 
constraint on the exchange rate should, in principle, act as a disciplinary device on the 
fiscal authorities, or more generally on economic policies.  
 
In currency unions, or in multilateral exchange rate arrangements, the issue of negative 
externalities—that loose fiscal policy might have on other member states—might also 
enhance fiscal discipline.
5 Participation in the ERM II would then add an additional 
constraint that comes from the negative effects that each country’s policies might have on 
the rest of its partners.  
 
Recent empirical work on this subject shows that fiscal authorities do actually tend to be 
more conservative in countries that have adopted currency boards, or are participating in 
multilateral currency unions (Fatas and Rose, 2001, for example). Regarding the new EU 
member states, Figure 2 shows that there appears a loose association between the size of 
budget deficits and that of the current account.
6 Notice that the two countries, which have 
been operating a currency board over the last few years—Estonia and Lithuania,—are 
ones that appear to be clear outliers. Latvia, also in a similar position has also followed a 
pegged exchange rate system, albeit relative to the SDR.  
 
                                                 
5 The Stability and Growth Pact instituted by the EU has also been interpreted in this fashion (see 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998, for example). 
6 Although it is hard to make a strong case given that current account deficits in some of these countries are 
also explained by imports of capital goods, and funded through sizeable FDI flows.  
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Exchange rate stability is also often associated with a stable macroeconomic environment 
that is conducive to investment, including from abroad, and hence growth. An 
unwarranted exchange rate shock may affect negatively growth prospects and hurt 
confidence in the market. There is ample evidence that unanticipated monetary policy 
shocks lead to sizeable changes in the exchange rate that, in turn, spillover to the trade 
balances, and GDP growth. The evidence on the response of output to exchange rate 
shocks is documented in a number of studies (see Clements et al, 2001, and Angeloni et 
al, 2002, for example and several references therein particularly relating to other 
international studies). The potency of this channel increases with the degree of openness 
to trade. In addition, exogenous exchange rate shocks (i.e., not related to monetary policy 
actions in the home country) can also be destabilizing. For example, an unanticipated 
monetary policy shock in another country may have negative effects on domestic output 
and inflation.  
 
Finally, a fixed exchange rate system may be of benefit to countries with less-developed 
or illiquid financial markets. Without underestimating the risks that such a practice 
entails, a fixed exchange rate system limits the exchange risk and encourages foreign 
borrowing by domestic residents. Indeed, the lack of depth in the financial markets in 
these countries suggests that these benefits could be significant. Hence, by temporarily 
removing this market imperfection countries may benefit through faster growth and real 
convergence with the rest of the EU.  Estonia stands out as a notable example in that 
regard. Given the success of the currency board over the last ten years, foreign borrowing 
has increased steadily and has, to some extent, provided vital liquidity to the domestic 
market. 
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Exchange Rate Bands: An Insurance Policy for EMU 
 
As countries prepare for membership into the euro area, one major concern will be to 
ensure that the exchange rate level, that will prevail on the day that the rates are 
irrevocably fixed, is consistent with economic fundamentals. “The criterion on 
participation in the exchange rate mechanism …shall mean that a Member State has 
respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the European Monetary System 
without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the examination.” (Article 
121, EC Treaty). As the statement reveals, it is envisaged that a stay inside the ERM II, 
for at least two years without any “severe tensions”, shall constitute evidence that the 
chosen parity is indeed consistent with fundamentals.  
 
The alternative would be that exchange rates are allowed to float freely, and to adjust in 
line with the evolving fundamentals. It is often argued that the process of real 
convergence requires considerable exchange rate flexibility and fixing completely the 
exchange rate will force, alternatively, adjustment of prices and/or output. The negative 
impact on these countries’ growth prospects may delay the process of real convergence 
and complicate the stetting of monetary policy.  
 
While the latter is a valid line of reasoning, we argue that such a strategy also involves 
significant risks. In particular, under a floating exchange rate regime there is no guarantee 
that exchange rate dynamics will move consistently in line with developments in the 
fundamentals. Hence the remainder of this section describes a number of potentially 
destabilizing events that may interfere with the determination of a “favourable” exchange 
rate level. It is argued that participation in the ERM can be thought of as an insurance 
policy that countries should obtain in order to ensure that, at the time of fixing the 
exchange rates to the euro, the market rate does not differ significantly from the rate that 
is seen as favourable from a long-term viewpoint.  
 
Exchange rate dynamics can be self-sustaining over considerable periods of time and can 
therefore lead to unjustifiable changes in exchange rates even under conditions of  
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macroeconomic stability, and fiscal prudence. As Frankel and Rose (1994) point out, 
exchange rate movements cannot, in general,  be explained by economic fundamentals 
(see Box 2 for more on bubbles). Speculative bubbles can drive a wedge between spot, 
and equilibrium exchange rates. On the contrary, official interventions within a target 
zone system—such as the ERM II—underpinned by credible policies can short-circuit the 
dynamics of bubbles, pin down expectations and eliminate excessive exchange rate 
volatility. Spillovers from other asset bubbles, in a world of free capital flows, may also 
trigger exchange rate misalignments. An example of this is the recent increase, and 
subsequent collapse, of US equity prices and the ensuing fall in the value of the dollar.  
 
Exchange rates may also overshoot their equilibrium levels and such disequilibria may 
persist for considerable time. In his classic paper Dornbusch (1976) demonstrated that in 
the short-run nominal exchange rates may overshoot their long-run levels. Under this 
setup an unanticipated increase in the nominal money supply—in the presence of short-
run price rigidities—requires an exchange rate overshooting (depreciation), and a 
subsequent appreciation that will put downward pressure on interest rates, and hence 
boost money demand; bringing about the new equilibrium in the money market. One of 
the predictions of the model, specifically that—for a fairly general set of assumptions—
the real exchange rate and the real interest rate differential should be positively correlated 
(i.e., that high interest real rates will push the real exchange rate higher), does seem to 
hold over long periods suggesting that such exchange rate behaviour cannot be dismissed 
(see Rogoff, 2002, for a recent exposition of the model, for example.) 
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Box 2: Exchange Rate Bubbles 
 
A well known finding in empirical studies of the exchange rate determination is that a wide range of 
standard models—including models with fundamentals and flexible or sticky prices, portfolio 
balance models, or specifications that include news among other variables,—score poorly in out-of-
sample forecasting compared with a simple random walk model (i.e., a model that assumes that the 
exchange rate is a simple function of last period’s exchange rate and a random shock). 
Consequently, this evidence points to the fact that economic fundamentals—including money 
supply, interest rates, inflation, GDP, current account balances—contain little information that is 
useful for predicting exchange rates in the short- and medium-term. If this finding is taken seriously 
then there are two possible explanations that may account for the failure of traditional model to 
account for the variability of exchange rates (Frankel and Rose, 1994, for example). Either 
exchange rates are purely driven by real/unobservable shocks (e.g., productivity shocks, or shocks 
in tastes), or speculative bubbles drive exchange rate dynamics (see also Obstfeld, 1996, for 
example).  The second possibility is indeed important.  
 
A number of studies have actually attempted to test for the presence of bubbles in the foreign 
exchange market and have reported some evidence in favor of exchange rate bubbles (Meese,1986, 
Evans, 1986, for example). Although Frankel and Rose (1994) argue that these studies, and more 
general any work on the topic, cannot help establish beyond any reasonable doubt the existence of a 
bubble—or accept the alternative hypothesis of unknown/unobservable fundamentals, or missing 
variables—they also recognize the fact that exchange rate variation cannot be explained with most 
models of fundamentals is, to some extent, consistent with the existence of bubbles.  
 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the link between equity market bubbles and exchange rate bubbles. 
The recent experience from the stock markets suggests that there could be a strong association 
between the equity bubble that developed in the 1990s, and burst in 1999-2000, and the behavior of 
the dollar exchange rate over the same period. This would be obvious in a world with liberalized 
capital flows (see Ventura, 2002, for a discussion on related issues). Under these circumstances the 
risk that exchange rate misalignments occur, and persist, seems more plausible.  
  - 17 -
Foreign exchange market volatility—enhanced, very often, by short-term speculative 
flows—can also have a destabilizing effect on a country’s exchange rate. Indeed, 
exchange rate fluctuations among the major world currencies can exacerbate current 
account imbalances in emerging countries, and affect the ability of countries to service 
foreign debt. Countries may be also affected directly, or indirectly, by currency crises in 
another country, or part, of the world. In these cases, the exchange rate dynamics can be 
disrupted imposing significant costs to countries; particularly, to ones that aim to fix 
permanently their exchange rate relative another currency.  
 
On the contrary, a target zone can be inherently stabilizing with the expectations of future 
interventions stabilizing the current exchange, even more than the underlying 
fundamentals (see Krugman, 1991, and Gerber and Svensson, 1994, for references on the 
vast literature regarding the empirical research on the topic). In his seminal paper 
Krugman (1991) showed how the exchange rate behaves differently within a perfectly 
credible target zone compared with a free float. When the exchange rate appreciates and 
is close to the upper band of a target zone, the probability of an intervention increases and 
that slows down the rate of appreciation. Hence, when a future depreciation is expected 
that is immediately discounted by the market and the exchange rate immediately changes 
accordingly—sometimes referred to as the “honeymoon” effect. 
 
It could be argued that the risk of a speculative attack inside a fixed exchange rate regime 
does not disappear completely; or the nature of risk changes. That is certainly true 
although the ERM II arrangement is flexible enough, in terms of the size of the 
fluctuation bands and more importantly the possibility of realignments—which can be 
requested, among others, by the Member State, or the ECB,—to be able to cope better 
than its predecessor with such events. Finally the size of the available reserves inside the 
ERM II increases drastically, relative to the size of the countries, and that in itself may 
also act as a deterrent against “one-way” bets. 
 
Note that the above discussion rests on the very strong assumption that policy makers 
know with certainty the “equilibrium” exchange rate and are therefore better-off choosing  
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that rate rather than allowing the market to determine an alternative rate which could 
inconsistent with the economy’s long-run dynamics. That is a strong assumption, 
although from the policymakers’ viewpoint, macroeconomic stability, the health of the 
financial system, fiscal consolidation and market liberalization are prerequisites for 
countries that wish to gradually fix their exchange rates to the euro and eventually join 
the euro area, and these policies should eventually ensure the consistency of the exchange 
rate with the long-run fundamentals. Under these circumstances, the country will 
eventually achieve domestic and external balance and the exchange rate should gradually 
find its long-run equilibrium path. 
 
The ERM as a Policy Coordination Tool 
 
The theory on international policy coordination, which flourished in the 1980s, 
emphasized the efficiency losses that arise from “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies. Under 
freely floating exchange rates a non-cooperative equilibrium can be inefficient since each 
country perceives an unrealistically favourable unemployment-inflation tradeoff. By 
setting monetary policy—taking into account other countries’ policies as given—a 
country believes it can affect the money supply and the exchange rate. For example, an 
exchange rate appreciation can lead to lower inflation at a lower cost in terms of output 
loss (the country literally exports inflation to its partners). If every country behaves in a 
similar way, the exchange rate will remain unchanged (assuming countries have similar 
sizes) and output will decline. By recognizing the spillover effects of monetary policy 
countries can avoid these negative costs and coordination is the first-best policy response 
(see Cooper, 1985, for example, and references therein). The exchange rate mechanism 
and the ERM II, may certainly be justified from this angle.  Strict exchange rate 
arrangements “tie the hands” of the politicians, and of policy makers, and minimize the 
possibility of myopic “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies. 
 
More importantly, the exchange rate mechanism should be also seen as part of a broader 
policy coordination apparatus that includes fiscal policy coordination at its centerpiece 
(Box 3). Fiscal policy coordination would be relatively weak, if not ineffective, under a  
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regime of fully flexible exchange rates and this is especially true for small, open, 
economies where there is a close correspondence between fiscal deficits, current account 
deficits and exchange rate movements. 
 
However, in the context of the accession countries, and the roadmap for membership in 
the euro zone, a second related issue is significant. Since, countries have to “perform” in 
terms of the Maastricht criteria for inflation, interest rates, budget deficits and debt levels, 
competitive devaluations (or revaluations) are likely to hurt (some) countries’ chances of 
meeting these criteria on time, and hence are unwarranted from an institutional 
viewpoint.  Table 1 shows the likely effects of such a possible devaluation on the chances  
of (still) meeting the Maastricht criteria. A unilateral devaluation by one country will lead 
to deterioration in the trade balance of partner countries. This in turn will affect 
negatively GDP growth, and possibly the budget deficit. Inflation should accelerate in the 
devaluing country, but slow down in the partner country. Hence, at least in theory, such a 
unilateral action will affect the countries’ chances of meeting the Maastricht criteria. This 
is examined quantitatively in more detail below.  
In what follows we attempt to quantify the implications of unilateral exchange rate 
actions by one country on the other countries aspiring to adopt the euro. In this 
hypothetical experiment we focus on conditions that might prevail during the process of 
convergence, with respect to the Maastricht criteria, in the absence of an exchange rate 
criterion, and hence of the ERM II.  We examine the extent to which a unilateral change 
in the exchange rate will have an effect—via the trade channel—on the trade balances, 
output growth and inflation of the countries that are preparing to adopt the euro. The 
experiment examines only the likely, maximum, impact effect through bilateral trade 
flows and not the second round, and third country, effects that might also arise. This 
exercise is likely to present us with broad, ballpark estimates that are useful for   
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Box 3. Pre-Accession Country Surveillance, and Policy coordination 
 
The policy coordination/country surveillance apparatus set up by the European Commission for accession 
countries, and new Member States centers around four basic elements: 
 
1.  The Fiscal notification system whereby accession countries report to the commission services debt and 
deficit figures calculated in accordance with the EU methodology based on the ESA 95 system of national 
accounts. Fiscal notifications use the same format, and require countries to submit the same data, as the 
fiscal notifications provided by Member States in the framework of the Excessive Deficit Procedure  (see 
European Commission Enlargement Paper 13, 2002). 
 
2.  The Pre-accession Economic Programs include a detailed description of the plans of the authorities in the 
areas of fiscal, and structural reform and a medium-term fiscal plan Procedure  (see European Commission 
Enlargement Paper 14, 2002). 
 
3.  The reports on the macroeconomic and financial sector stability developments in candidate countries (see 
European Commission Enlargement Paper 11, 2002). 
 
4.  The European Commission publishes on a bi-annual basis macroeconomic forecasts for the candidate 
countries (see European Commission Enlargement Paper 12, 2002). 
 
 
Form the European Central Bank’s side, there are regular meetings between the ECB and candidate countries 
which center around the need to bring financial/payment systems in line with those in the eurosystem and to 
ensure a smooth transition into the euro area.  
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highlighting the compatibility of the alternative scenario—of fully flexible exchange 
rate—with the remaining three Maastricht criteria. 
 
The data used are bilateral trade figures for the ten acceding countries. The question of 
interest here is to what extent the bilateral trade flows are significant and therefore likely 
to constitute a significant channel through which a currency devaluation might affect the 
bilateral trade balances of partner countries. The experiment involves a 20 percent 
unilateral devaluation of the exchange rate of a given country (each one in turn) against 
the euro. It is assumed that the other nine countries continue, for at least the short-term, to 
maintain their exchange rate parity against the euro, and hence that simply implies a 
change in the bilateral exchange rate against each of the candidate countries. 
 
Table 2 shows estimates of the possible maximum impact on the trade balance and hence 
GDP growth rate—assuming that all the other variables (e.g., private consumption, 
investment and government spending) remain unchanged,—and inflation. Each column 
denotes the devaluing country and on each row we tabulate the effect on a particular 
partner. For example, if the Czech Republic were to devalue its exchange rate vis-à-vis 
the euro by 20 percent, the trade balance of Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Malta would deteriorate by some 1/4 percent of GDP, and that of Cyprus by almost 1/3 of 
1 percent of GDP.   
 
The effects are based on a long-run, unit, elasticity of exports and imports on relative 
prices. Relative prices are assumed to change proportionally to the change in the 
exchange rate, while the inflationary effects of a devaluation are not taken into account in 
the calculations: essentially, it is assumed that a 20 percent nominal devaluation will have 
the same effect on the real exchange rate. Table 3 repeats the same exercise but takes into 
account of the likely impact on the bilateral real exchange rate of the higher inflation in 
the devaluating country. In this case the spillovers are lower, as it should be expected, 
given that the relative price change is smaller. Overall, all these simulations are based on 
a partial equilibrium analysis and assume all other variables remain unchanged  
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The effects on the trade balance and current account can be substantial for some 
countries. Bilateral trade flows, among some of these ten countries, are sizeable and 
hence the spillover effects quite strong. Given that most countries are relatively small and 
open (i.e., the share of total trade to GDP is high) the impact on GDP growth can be 
substantial. It is estimated that a devaluation can have significantly negative effects on 
the trade balance—and hence GDP growth—for a number of, particularly, smaller 
countries (e.g., Cyprus, Malta, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia). These effects 
range from 1/3 and 1/2 of 1 percent for the smaller countries, and between 0.1 and 0.2 
percent for the bigger economies. The effects are significant particularly if one were to 
take into account of the likely second round affects to employment and consumption. 
 
Table 2 also tabulates estimates of the likely effects on inflation based on the assumption 
of complete pass-through from exchange rate changes to prices, using the share of 
imports to GDP as an indication of the weight of tradable in the consumer price basket. 
This working assumption—which is by no means a realistic one—allows us to obtain an 
upper bound for the impact on inflation. Since inflation in these countries is likely to 
decelerate, following a devaluation shock by a partner country, the magnitude of the 
could be sizeable reaching in some cases 2 percent (for example in the case of the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia), but generally varying between 1/3 and 1/2 of 1 percent. 
 
The effects of the exchange rate shock on the other variables of interest can also be 
roughly quantified. For example, a 1 percent fall in GDP growth is associated with a 1/4–
1/2 percent of GDP deterioration in a country’s budget deficit (see Brunila et al, 2002, for 
estimates of elasticities). For example, a devaluation by Poland could lead to 
deterioration in the general government deficit of the Cyprus by some 0.15 of 1 percent 
of GDP, and of Estonia, Latvia Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia by some 0.1 percent of 1 
percent of GDP. These effects are nontrivial, especially when countries are trying to keep 
budget deficits in check in order to meet the Maastricht criterion for budget deficits. 
 
The effects on interest rates are hard to measure, although one would expect that, ceteris 
paribus, given the lower import prices and hence inflation, and the GDP weaker growth  
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interest rates could decline. However, the increase in the budget deficit should be 
expected to have the opposite effects, and such an unwarranted outcome could be 
significant for those countries that are hardest hit.  
 
Besides these cross-country (negative) spillovers there could be a significant impact on 
the devaluing country’s inflation through higher import price from the euro area. A 
unilateral devaluation by one country, assuming that there is no response by any other 
country, will have a positive short-term impact for exports, but a negative effect in terms 
of higher imported inflation from the euro area. The aggregate effect for the EU and the 
euro area, also shown in Tables 3 and 4, allow us to produce ballpark estimates for these 
effects. For example, a 20 percent devaluation by the Czech Republic will lead to a 5½ 
percent higher inflation as a result of an higher import prices from the euro area; these 
aggregate effects are shown in the last two columns of the table. Although these should 
be interpreted as maximum (long-run) effects—since they are based on the assumption of 
complete pass through from exchange rates to prices—they are nevertheless significant. 
Trade integration has advanced significantly among these countries and large swings in 
exchange rates are bound to have a major impact on trade flows and prices. 
 
On the whole, it would appear that exchange rate stability is warranted, especially during 
the period of convergence relative to the Maastricht criteria. Although one could argue 
that exchange rate flexibility could be useful, especially given the dynamics of real 
convergence in these countries, the Maastricht criteria were essentially designed to be 
complemented with enhanced policy coordination, and hence diminished exchange rate 
variability and monetary policy autonomy. The simple exercise conducted in this section 
illustrates that, since the temptation to profit—through an exchange rate devaluation—
can be high, a fixed exchange rate arrangement provides the insurance for countries that 
are being assessed before adopting the euro. These simulations also reveal the sensitivity 
of inflation in the accession countries to large swings in exchange rates.  
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Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in EMU: A case of learning 
by doing? 
 
Ultimately the exchange rate arrangement is at the center of the monetary policy 
coordination mechanism. Countries surrender monetary policy autonomy in favour of 
more exchange rate stability, and gradually prepare for their participation into the 
monetary union. The exchange rate is no longer available as a tool for macroeconomic 
fine-tuning and under these circumstances flexibility of prices (and wages) becomes 
critical. Fiscal policy itself remains constrained (for discretionary policy management) 
and is allowed ultimately to act solely—through the operation of automatic stabilizers—
as a shock absorbing mechanism. 
 
Under this new environment private sector agents need to adjust their behaviour. Since 
exchange rate flexibility is no longer permitted, prices and wages must take the burden of 
adjustment. Hence, the behaviour of wage setters will also have to change and the ERM 
can provide some breathing space prior to the big test. In addition, participation in a 
quasi-fixed exchange rate system should facilitate the convergence with the euro area, 
both in terms of macroeconomic indicators, and institutionally. The latter is particularly 
important for the central bank and other financial institutions that will face a new 
environment after the adoption of the euro. 
 
In what follows we examine two particular aspects: (i) the issue of  inflation, and 
business cycle convergence which is particularly important upon the entry into the euro 
zone, and (ii) the question of possible changes in the monetary transmission mechanism 
that countries will have to face. 
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Inflation and GDP Synchronization with EU 
 
Table 4 provides some indication of the extent of synchronization of the business cycles 
across the ten new EU countries, and with the other large euro zone members. The 
aggregate figures for the EU and the euro zone are also included in the same table. A 
number of important stylized facts stand out. First, with the exception of some groups of 
countries (e.g. the Baltics), business cycles are not highly synchronized across the ten 
new members of the EU. Secondly, a number of countries’ business cycles appear to be 
highly synchronized with the euro area business cycle (e.g., Cyprus, Hungary). On the 
other hand, in the rest of the group business cycles appear to be rather idiosyncratic, with 
the exception of some pairs of countries (Slovenia and Estonia, Slovenia and Lithuania, 
for example). 
 
One can read these stylized facts in different ways. It can be argued that business cycle 
correlations are relatively small and the lack of synchronization of business cycles may 
be a problem going forward into the euro zone. On the other hand, staying in the ERM, 
prior to the adoption of the euro, may be desirable as more coordination of monetary 
policy vis-à-vis the euro area may indeed provide the ground for increased 
synchronization between the euro area, and these countries.  Indeed, there is ample 
evidence which suggests that business cycle synchronization tends to increase between 
countries participating in a fixed exchange rate area (Artis and Zhang, 1997, 1999, for 
example, and references therein). Finally, the lack of business cycle correlation across 
countries may simply be a symptom of widely different policies (e.g., monetary policies). 
Hence, when policies are more aligned inside the ERM some convergence of business 
cycles, may indeed take place (on this point see Kontolemis and Samiei, 2000, for 
example).  
 
Of course, in a world where central bankers care primarily about keeping inflation in 
check, the dynamics of inflation across countries are important. Table 5 shows the 
correlation coefficients for annual inflation rates (top panel) and for shocks to the  
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consumer price index (lower panel). Inflation rates seem to be correlated although there is 
a spurious element to those results due to the negative trend in most of those series. When 
one filters out some of the systematic movements in the consumer price index (see the 
bottom panel of Table 5) the results become more interesting and reveal in some cases 
similarities in the inflation environment in some countries (e.g., Czech Republic with 
Hungary, and Slovakia; Hungary with Slovenia, Slovenia, and Poland; Slovenia with 
Hungary, and Slovakia). Interestingly, in none of these countries inflation shocks are 
correlated with those in the euro area. 
 
The fact that there is a very weak correlation between inflation shocks in the candidate 
countries and the euro area, but in some cases strong similarity between the candidate 
countries themselves could indicate that other common variables might account for this 
stylized fact. The exchange rate is an obvious candidate and Table 6 tabulates the 
correlation coefficients between shocks to the effective exchange rates. The results do not 
reveal strong support for this assertion (i.e., large positive correlations between exchange 
rate shocks), although in some cases there appears to be some association (e.g., between 
Estonia and Latvia, the Czech republic and Poland, Hungary and Poland). If exchange 
rate shocks were driving inflation dynamics in these countries a natural corollary is that 
correlation between inflation shocks with the euro area should be expected to increase 
after countries irrevocably fix their intra-euro area exchange rates. Hence, a participation 
in the ERM should set in motion a process of convergence of inflation (shocks) which 




This discussion makes it clear that more analysis, perhaps using an econometric model, is 
needed to identify precisely the source of shocks. Nevertheless, one possible conclusion 
is that idiosyncratic shocks to the exchange rate will diminish under a fixed exchange rate 
                                                 
7 Of course, a strong negative correlation between the effective exchange rate could also indicate that a 
shock to one country’s exchange rate feeds through to another one. The source of this shock is important. 
For example, suppose that in response to a productivity shock,  prices jump and the exchange rate 
appreciates in country A. That could imply a depreciation in country B’s exchange rate and possibly a 
positive shock to prices, hence there would be positive correlation in inflation shocks, but negative 
correlation of exchange rate shocks.  
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regime, and should contribute to more convergence in the inflation dynamics across these 
countries. 
 
Changes in the Transmission Mechanism 
 
Exchange rate stability implies changes in the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
since the exchange rate is no longer a viable instrument (i.e., the exchange rate channel is 
closed). In a standard macro model, an unanticipated monetary tightening leads to a fall 
in prices and GDP. In smaller, more open, economies the exchange rate is usually an 
important channel through which the change in the monetary policy feeds through to 
GDP and prices. For example, a monetary tightening leads to an exchange rate 
appreciation which puts a downward pressure on prices and affects negatively GDP 




What are the policy implications for these countries? On the one hand, if countries’ 
primary objective is price stability such a change could make disinflation more costly in 
terms of output loss. The exchange rate, which remains fixed, does not facilitate faster 
disinflation, to the extent that exchange rate changes do actually feed through to prices. 
Figure 3 shows the response of euro-area countries’ GDP to an unanticipated monetary 
shock under fixed intra-euro area exchange rates, and (the dashed lines) under flexible 
exchange rates (see Clements, Kontolemis, and Levy, 2001). There are two stylized facts 
that are worth pointing out. First, the costs of disinflation will not be equally shared 
across a single currency area. Inside the euro area countries will need to adjust to the fact 
that monetary policy will be common (i.e., it will respond to a weighted average of the 
national shocks) and countries’ transmission mechanism may differ. Secondly, for 
countries for which the exchange rate channel was significant (e.g., Belgium, France and 
                                                 
8 For recent papers on this topic see Clements, Kontolemis and Levy (2001), Angeloni, 
Kashyap, Mojon, and Terlizzese (2002), and references therein.  
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Germany in Figure 3) a common monetary policy will, at least initially, impose 
significant adjustment costs.  
 
These facts suggest that a pre-entry “acclimatization” period inside the ERM may indeed 
provide benefits for countries before they actually enter the more rigorous test of the 
common currency area. During this period countries will pursue other structural 
reforms/institutional changes that will bring their economies closer to the EU. In addition, 
it can be argued that more variability in output, that may be the consequence of  “one-
size-fits-all” monetary policy, may be better tackled prior to the irrevocable fixing of the 
exchange rates inside the euro area, especially given the somewhat weaker fiscal rules 
during this period. The weakening of the exchange rate channel should force more 
discipline to wage, and price setters. Under these circumstances, and given some leeway 
inside the ERM II in terms of the wider fluctuation bands, a period of “internship” inside 
the exchange rate mechanism should be seen as beneficial. 
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Figure 3. EMU Model: Effect on GDP with Fixed/Flexible Intra-EMU Exchange
R1 / (percent deviation from baseline, by
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Source: Clements, Kontolemis, and Levy 2001. 
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Are there Risks, and Can Policies Help? 
 
The preceding discussion was centered on the positive aspects of participation in the 
ERM. The arguments in favour of participation in a fixed exchange rate system are 
particularly relevant for the accession countries that are seeking to adopt the euro after 
they join the EU in May 2004.  
 
What are the risks to this strategy? One issue that has been brought up is that of capital 
flows and the risks that these might pose to the viability of the exchange rate peg itself 
(see Begg et al, 2003, for example). We noted earlier that the alternative to a fixed 
exchange rate system, a flexible (or a managed float) exchange rate arrangement, would 
also involve significant risks to new member states—albeit of different nature compared 
a fixed exchange rate arrangement. In this section we discuss whether capital flows are 
indeed a new phenomenon for these countries or, unlike the existing member states, 
whether these countries have indeed experienced sizeable capital inflows—during their 
transition to market economies—and have generally managed to steer safely their 
economies. Second we briefly discuss whether the conventional wisdom that there exists 
an important trade-off between inflation and exchange rate variability is indisputable, and 
whether policies and institutions matter in this regard.  
 
It is often argued that capital flows in the run-up to the euro adoption could put 
considerable strain on the Exchange Rate Mechanism forcing countries either to change 
policies, or abandon the central parity relative to the euro. Increased capital flows have 
been observed in Greece, for example, in the run-up to the adoption of the euro (Box 4, 
provides a short overview of the Greek experience inside the ERM). These flows were, 
for the most part, “hot money” looking to take advantage of the higher yields offered by 
Greek government bonds; a fall in the risk premium, which was the result of the 
convergence toward EMU, and higher inflation—and hence interest rate—differential 
were the main reasons behind the increased appetite for government paper 
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Box 4. ERM participation: The Greek Experience 
 
Brief History inside the ERM 
 
•   Greece became the 12
th member of the eurozone, on the January 1, 2001. 
•   On March 16, 1998 the Greek drachma entered the Exchange Rate Mechanism at a central parity that corresponded to 
a 12.3 percent devaluation of the currency. The devaluation was considered important, at that point, in light of the 
expected adoption of the euro, and in order to correct for an overvaluation of the drachma which would have led to a 
further deterioration of the current account, and weakening growth prospects (see Bank of Greece, 2003). 
•   The entry in to the ERM was accompanied by an announcement for speeding up structural reforms, and fiscal 
consolidation (through expenditure cuts of some 1 percent of GDP in 1998).  
•   In September 1998, the Greek government decided that it would participate in the ERM II with a wide fluctuation 
band (of ±15 percent), as of January 1, 1999. 
•   The (de facto) devaluation of the Greek currency in 1998 sparked significant inflows of capital, essentially toward 
high yielding government bonds that offered investors sizeable expected capital gains. As a result short-term interest 
rates fell by some 400 basis points compared to the pre-devaluation period. Long-term interest rates also fell by 200 
basis points, and the yield curve inverted as market expectations for further interest rate cuts were bolstered. 
•   At that point, the authorities faced an important policy dilemma. Strong capital inflows were exerting downward 
pressure on interest rates during a period in which inflationary pressures abounded, thus risking the attainability of the 
Maastricht criterion for inflation. These were addressed, as explained below, through a series of revaluations of the 
exchange rate combined with sterilisation of capital inflows. 
•   To ensure that the target of inflation (i.e., in terms of the Maastricht criteria) would not be jeopardised, the Bank of 
Greece allowed a moderate appreciation of the drachma inside the band (the currency appreciated relative to the 
central parity on average by 7 percent during March 1998-January 2000. Effectively therefore, the (de facto) 
devaluation was significantly smaller than 12¼ percent (i.e., about 6 percent). 
•   At the same time, and to keep a lid on inflation, the Bank of Greece initiated a program of sterilisation of (part of) the 
capital inflows. 
•   In January 2000 the central parity was adjusted again, reflecting some 3.5 percent revaluation of the currency vis-à-vis 
the euro. 
•   The revaluation of the central parity in January 2000 was the last exchange rate adjustment. In June 2000 the EU 
Council confirmed that the central ERM parity of the drachma would the actual conversion rate for the adoption of the 
euro. 
•   The period after the last revaluation of the drachma was characterised generally by a depreciating currency, and this 
tendency continued until the adoption of the euro.  
•   During the years of membership inside the ERM II the Bank of Greece intervened on various occasions to slowdown 
the rate of depreciation (appreciation) of the currency inside the band 
 
Some useful lessons from the example of Greece 
 
•   The example of Greece reminds us that entry into the ERM II should be accompanied by a strong commitment for 
pursuing structural reforms, and speeding up fiscal consolidation. 
•   The option of using wide bands inside the ERM II proved invaluable for steering the currency smoothly toward the 
final conversion rate.  
•   In addition, the wide bands also facilitated the anti-inflation policy of the authorities. 
•   However, discrete adjustments of the central parity may also take place and—provided that these are backed-up by 
credible policies,—these can be managed successfully, even in a environment with strong capital flows, and currency 
speculation. 
•   The announcement of the final conversion rate well in advance of the actual adoption of the euro was instrumental in 
stabilising the currency. This further contributed toward the smooth convergence of other variables (e.g., nominal 
interest rates).   
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The conditions prevailing currently in the majority of the candidate countries are 
considerably different. First, inflation rates in the candidate countries have converged 
significantly during the past few years, although productivity differences could sustain a 
small differential in the medium term. Consequently, it appears that that the level of 
nominal convergence prevailing now is significantly more advanced compared with the 
other EU countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, country risk premia have also come 
down markedly during the process of transformation of the these economies, and 
particularly as a result of the effective fiscal consolidation process that has taken place, 
and the prospective EU membership. The candidate countries have also experienced 
sizable capital inflows, especially in the form of foreign direct investment and portfolio 
flows, as these economies opened up and proceeded with the transformation of their 
economies. Table 7, tabulates (average, net) capital flows in the acceding, and other 
current member states, and presents a measure for the variability of capital flows which, 
in the case of some countries, has been quite significant. Data for the member states prior 
to the adoption of the euro (1997-2001) is also compared with previous periods (1990-
1996 for most countries; but 1977-96 for Greece and 1982-96 for Spain and Portugal) 
corresponding to the periods prior, and just after, their accession into the EU. The data 
show that the candidate countries have experienced significant capital flows, especially 
FDI and portfolio, particularly when compared with the member states either during the 
period before the adoption of the euro, or earlier.
9 In addition to the high level (as a 
percent of GDP), flows have also been relatively more volatile in candidate countries, 
relative to the EU member states. These stylized observations reveal that these countries 
have coped relatively well in an environment of strong capital flows, and in many cases 
diminished—or in some cases no—exchange rate flexibility.  
 
It remains to be seen whether in the run-up to the adoption of the euro there could indeed 
be significant profit opportunities that would increase significantly short-term (potentially 
reversible) capital flows looking for more attractive returns. As indicated before, 
although one cannot rule out this scenario, the fact that nominal convergence has 
                                                 
9 Of course there are exceptions. During 1997-2001 Ireland received huge foreign direct investment flows, 
and Greece portfolio flows.    
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progressed significantly in these countries suggests that these flows may be smaller than 
in previous episodes (Table 8).  Further progress is expected during the period prior to 
EU membership and hence before countries decide to participate in the ERM II. 
 
Increased capital flows can put enormous pressure on fixed exchange rate regimes by 
pushing the exchange rate toward the top of the band. However, when the exchange rate 
moves toward the top of the ERM band a national central bank has unlimited reserves, 
since it intervenes by selling its own currency, and can easily defend the exchange rate 
peg. If the increased flows interfere with the other objectives of monetary policy, 
sterilization may also be effective in drying up excess domestic liquidity. Furthermore, as 
has been argued extensively in the literature, candidate countries will face an appreciation 
of their exchange rate during this catching-up period, a trend that would imply that 
exchange rates will tend to be closer to the top-, rather than the bottom-half, of the 
exchange rate band. However, when short-term capital flows, or “hot-money”, can be 
reversed easily (e.g. when interest rate differentials eventually shrink) a country may be 
faced with strong downward pressure on its exchange rate. Even in this case, the fact that 
the ERM II envisages relatively wide fluctuation bands minimizes significantly the 
probability of a severe tension in the system. The threat of unlimited intervention at the 
margin should also deter the build-up of one-way bets (see Box 5 for a discussion of the 
limits of such intervention). 
 
The period inside the ERM II will certainly be challenging especially as large (potentially 
reversible) capital flows and strong credit growth may test the commitment of 
policymakers and the credibility of the exchange rate system.  However, policies do 
matter and will predetermine, to a large extent, the experience of the countries inside the 
ERM II. A reference to Hungary’s policies in the 1990s, and more recently in 2003 can 
illustrate the importance of this point, particularly the significance of the policy-mix 
under a fixed exchange rate system. During 1998, in the aftermath of the turmoil in the 
international financial markets, monetary policy faced up to the pressure in the foreign 
exchange market and succeeded in maintaining the parity inside the narrow band of the 
crawling band. A solid fiscal track record in Hungary during 1998, skilful monetary and  
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exchange rate policies, and progress with structural reforms all contributed towards such 
an achievement (IMF, 1999a). In contrast, strong wage and price pressures—which led to 
a significant real effective exchange rate appreciation—and a highly expansionary fiscal 
policy brought about a conflict between the authorities’ inflation and external objectives, 
and precipitated a series of speculative attacks in 2003 (IMF, 2003). 
 
Fiscal policy, in particular, plays an important role in that regard. Several recent studies 
of currency rate crises have shown that the level of fiscal deficit as a percent of GDP—
among other important variables—constitutes an important (leading) indicator for 
currency crises (see Edwards, 1989, Edwards and Montiel, 1989, Edwards and Santaella, 
1992, Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdes, 1995,  Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995, 
1996, Frankel and Rose, 1996, Milessi-Ferretti, and Razin, 1996, IMF, 1999b, for 
example, and other references therein). Hence, one can infer that the enhanced fiscal 
discipline and coordination mechanisms within the EU, and the euro area, should—
ceteris paribus—reduce considerably the risk of a currency crisis during participation in 
the ERM-II. 
 
Leaving aside the issue of capital flows, another interesting question is whether a given 
monetary policy strategy can be successful in delivering low inflation and stable 
exchange rate within the ERM II. Another one is whether different policy regimes and 
institutions may be more effective in stabilizing the exchange rate inside the ERM. The 
Council stated explicitly that the ERM II is flexible enough to accommodate the features 
of a number of existing exchange rate strategies.
10 This has been taken to imply that 
countries operating inflation targeting regimes could, in principle,  
                                                 
10  The only clear incompatibilities with the ERM II are the cases of free floating, crawling pegs, pegs 
against third currencies, and a unilateral euroisation.  
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Box 5: Exchange Rate Mechanism: How much intervention at the margin? 
 
According to the operating procedures for the exchange rate mechanism, agreed between the ECB and the National 
Central Banks, intervention at the margins will “in principle” be automatic and unlimited (see Official Journal of the 
European Communities, 1998). However, the ECB and the participating National Central Bank may suspend automatic 
intervention if that is deemed as conflicting with their primary objective. The question is what does this mean in practise, 
assuming that both party’s objective is to preserve price stability? 
 
•   If there is pressure at the bottom of the band the risk is simply that the expansion of the euro area money supply 
might threaten the attainment of the ECB’s primary objective. However, the Table below shows that the countries in 
question are rather small and the share of their money supply, relative to that of the euro area, is insignificant.  
•   Even if the amounts were noteworthy, and the euro-area money supply increased significantly, there is doubt as to 
the effect that such a “velocity shock” would pose on price stability; particularly in the short-run. 
•   If there is pressure at the top of the band the burden—in terms of the risk to price stability—falls to the candidate 
country. However, the country may choose to invoke Article 17 of the agreement and ask for a revaluation, or 
continue with a sterilised intervention at the margin. In that case, intervention implies an increase in the country’s 
reserves, and hence can be considered as a credible threat against market pressure. 
•   A decision to suspend intervention, according to the agreement, should be based on “factual evidence” (Article 3.2). 
 
Hence, the “suspension clause” is unlikely to be invoked easily. In the case of larger economies this may indeed be a 
more important issue, especially when a currency is drifting at the lower part of the band. However, even in this case the 
“suspension clause” might minimize, to a certain extent, the build-up of  “one-way” bets against these currencies. 
 
Relative size of Candidate Countries’ Money Supply and Reserves 
        (Data based on 2002, unless otherwise stated) 
 
  M1, % of euro-area 
M1 
Foreign currency reserves, % of 
euro-area M1 
Foreign currency reserves, % of 
euro-area M3 
      
Cyprus 0.08    0.14  0.05 
Czech Rep  1.16  1.11  0.42 
Estonia 0.08  0.05  0.02 
Hungary 0.52  1/  0.46  0.17 
Latvia 0.09  0.06  0.02 
Lithuania 0.09  1/  0.11  0.04 
Malta  0.08 1/  0.08  0.03 1/ 
Poland  1.22 1/  1.20  0.45 1/ 
Slovakia 0.25  1/  0.42  0.16 
Slovenia 0.10  0.33  0.12 
      
  Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF; European Central Bank. 
  1/ Data for 2001.    
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continue with their existing monetary policy strategies so long as exchange rate stability 
is not threatened. 
 
Institutions matter in this regard. Kuttner and Posen (2001) point out that the traditional 
description of exchange rate regimes either in the corner or in the middle between 
irrevocably fixed and flexible exchange rates is rather misleading and they propose 
instead a “three-dimensional” view of monetary framework.
11 The latter takes into 
account the degree of autonomy of the central bank, and the transparency of its monetary 
targets, and suggests that the performance of free floaters might vary according to these 
characteristics. Interestingly, they show that those floaters that have independent central 
banks, and which have inflation targeting regimes, experience similar levels of exchange 
rate volatility to countries with hard pegs. Kuttner and Posen’s (2001) interpretation is 
that since monetary policy actions eventually dominate the portfolio balance (“one-off”) 
effects of (sterilized) interventions, central bank independence discourages frequent 
interventions by the relevant authority (which in many countries lies within the authority 
of the Ministry of Finance, or is shared between the Central Bank and the Ministry of 
Finance). In addition, it is argued that independent central banks (frequently committed to 
keeping inflation in check) are more effective in communicating their policy intentions 
and in pinning-down inflation expectations, hence anchoring exchange rate expectations 
(see Kuttner and Posen, 2001, 2003, for example). In contrast, when central banks are 
less independent (sterilized) interventions can increase uncertainty about, on the one 
hand, the sustainability of the exchange rate and, on the other hand, the ability of the 
central bank to deliver on its domestic priorities.   
 
Needless to say, that granting of independence to central banks in various countries has 
proceeded hand-in-hand with the adoption of inflation targeting as a formal monetary 
policy strategy.  Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue that a strong commitment to an   
inflation target reduces both the variance of the exchange rate, and of interest rates. This 
is due to the fact that the monetary authorities offset more vigorously money demand 
                                                 
11 An interesting survey on exchange rate regimes is Mussa et al (2000), for example. A discussion on the 
pro and cons of exchange rate regimes for emerging market economies can be found in ECB (2003).   
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shocks, thus smoothing nominal interest rates and inflation. Detken and Gaspar (2003) 
show that exchange rate variability can be reduced, more generally, the more weight 
monetary authorities place on stabilizing inflation relative to output. In essence, these 
papers seem to argue that exchange rate stability can be the outcome of credible policies, 
aimed at controlling inflation, and is not exclusively the outcome of hard-pegs. 
 
Hence, based on this view, the experiences of new member states could differ 
significantly from what the traditional  “bi-polar” view might suggest. The establishment 
of independent central banks—which has been completed as part of the accession 
negotiations for EU entry—in all candidate countries should certainly contribute toward a 
more stable economic environment, better communication and execution of monetary 
policy and perhaps more exchange rate stability. Finally, it must be stressed that 
participation into the ERM is only but a temporary arrangement and countries have a 
clear exit strategy in place that, if carefully implemented, should lead to a smooth 
transition to Economic and Monetary Union.  




This paper discusses the reasoning behind the exchange rate policies set out in the 
Maastricht Treaty. The question of the appropriate exchange rate policies for new 
member states of the European Union is seen from the wider perspective of Economic 
and Monetary Union, and the creation of a single market.    
 
It is argued that exchange rate stability, per se, may be desirable. Exchange rate stability 
promotes trade and hence may contribute to stronger growth in the long run.   
Additionally, exchange rate stability may further lead to less inflation variability, and 
possibly to lower inflation, but in addition it may encourage governments into pursuing 
more prudent fiscal policies. 
 
The alternative of floating exchange rates may impose significant risks to countries which 
prepare to fix their exchange rates permanently vis-à-vis the euro. Exchange rates can 
drift out of line from fundamentals and countries may find themselves in a difficult 
position to choose an “unfavourable” exchange rate for entering into the monetary union.  
Instead, it is argued that an exchange rate mechanism provides an insurance for new 
member states, in the run-up to adopting the euro, and in addition prevents unilateral 
exchange rate changes that could hurt other countries’ chances from meeting the 
Maastricht criteria.  
 
The possible changes in the monetary policy transmission mechanism call for a period of 
“internship” inside the exchange rate mechanism which will allow some time for 
countries to begin adjusting their behaviour/policies to the requirements of a common 
currency area. That period inside the ERM II should also lead to more convergence in 
prices and business cycles. 
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The possibility of disruptions, or volatility in the exchange rate markets, as a result of 
strong capital flows cannot be ruled out. Nonetheless, it is argued that these countries 
have experienced sizeable inflows for several years—significantly more than many EU 
member states,—and have managed successfully to steer their economies clear of these 
volatile episodes. The level of nominal convergence of these countries vis-à-vis the EU 
has also advanced significantly, limiting the risk of exchange rate instability due to 
increased short-term capital flows, or hot-money (i.e., flows into government paper due 
to significant interest rate differentials, as was the case in Greece, for example). 
Additionally, the enhanced fiscal discipline and coordination mechanisms within the EU, 
and the euro area, should—ceteris paribus—reduce considerably the risk of a currency 
crisis during participation in the ERM-II. 
 
Institutions also matter and the establishment of independent central banks, with clear 
orientation for monetary policy, and transparent communication arrangements—in 
combination with the discipline of a target zone—should help in limiting excessive 
exchange rate volatility inside the exchange rate mechanism. Certainly, the flexibility of 
the system will also be key in delivering stability and ensuing a smooth transition toward 
the adoption of the euro. 
 
Hence, participation in ERM should be considered as an opportunity to achieve 
meaningful macroeconomic, and policy, convergence prior to the adoption of the euro, 
prepare for the single monetary policy framework, and create conditions that are 
conducive to trade creation and growth inside the European Union, and not a mere ad hoc 
test for exchange rate stability.  
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Table 1: Likely impact of Devaluation by one country in the run-up to the euro 
 
Effect on Candidate Country j 
Inflation Output  Budget 
Deficit 
Public Debt  Interest Rate  Country i 
      
Exchange Rate 
Appreciation 
Worsen  Improve Improve More  likely 
to improve 
More likely 
to go up 
Exchange Rate 
Depreciation 
Improve  Worsen Worsen More  likely 
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Table 2: Impact of a 20 percent devaluation by one country on Trade Balance, GDP growth and inflation 
 
Effect on the Trade Balance, GDP Growth (% of GDP) 
Devaluing Country 
 Hungary  Cyprus Czech  Rep Estonia Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia Slovenia France Germany Italy  Spain EU  Euro Area
Hungary   -0.07  -0.07 -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07 -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.08  -0.13  -0.08 -0.07 -0.20 -0.19 
Cyprus -0.32   -0.32  -0.32  -0.32  -0.32  -0.32 -0.32  -0.32  -0.32  -0.32  -0.32  -0.33 -0.32 -0.37 -0.35 
Czech Rep  -0.11  -0.10    -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10 -0.11  -0.12  -0.10  -0.11  -0.16  -0.11 -0.11 -0.21 -0.20 
Estonia -0.22  -0.21  -0.22    -0.23  -0.22  -0.21 -0.22  -0.21  -0.21  -0.22  -0.24  -0.22 -0.22 -0.33 -0.29 
Latvia -0.21  -0.21  -0.21  -0.22    -0.22  -0.21 -0.22  -0.21  -0.21  -0.21  -0.23  -0.21 -0.21 -0.28 -0.26 
Lithuania -0.16 -0.16  -0.16  -0.17  -0.17    -0.16 -0.17  -0.16  -0.16  -0.17  -0.18  -0.17 -0.16 -0.22 -0.20 
Malta -0.20  -0.20  -0.20  -0.20  -0.20  -0.20    -0.20  -0.20  -0.20  -0.23  -0.22  -0.23 -0.20 -0.34 -0.31 
Poland -0.12  -0.11  -0.12  -0.11  -0.11  -0.12  -0.11  -0.12  -0.11  -0.12  -0.13  -0.12 -0.12 -0.16 -0.16 
Slovakia -0.21  -0.20  -0.24 -0.20  -0.20  -0.20  -0.20 -0.21    -0.20  -0.21  -0.23  -0.21 -0.20 -0.27 -0.26 
Slovenia -0.19 -0.18  -0.19 -0.18  -0.18  -0.18  -0.18 -0.19  -0.19    -0.19  -0.21  -0.20 -0.19 -0.26 -0.26 
France  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00   -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 
Germany  0.04  0.04 0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 0.04  0.04  0.03   0.03 0.04  -0.01 0.00 
Italy  0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01  0.00 -0.01    0.00  -0.04 -0.03 
Spain -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07 -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08   -0.13 -0.12 
                              
Effect on Inflation 
Impact on  Hungary  Cyprus Czech Rep Estonia Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia Slovenia France Germany Italy  Spain EU  Euro Area
Hungary   0.00  -0.26 -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01 -0.29  -0.21  -0.06  -0.54  -2.72  -0.86 -0.22 -6.36 -5.81 
Cyprus -0.02   -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.04 -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.37  -0.53  -0.74 -0.29 -4.17 -3.27 
Czech Rep  -0.20  0.00    0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.46  -0.66  -0.07  -0.50  -2.96  -0.57 -0.22 -5.99 -5.48 
Estonia -0.09  0.00  -0.14    -0.33  -0.39  0.00  -0.35  -0.03  -0.02  -0.37  -1.58  -0.50 -0.13 -6.96 -5.36 
Latvia -0.09  0.00  -0.12  -0.56    -0.74  0.00  -0.46  -0.04  -0.02  -0.21  -1.42  -0.34 -0.11 -4.37 -3.43 
Lithuania -0.09 0.00  -0.13  -0.11  -0.15    0.00  -0.47  -0.02  -0.04  -0.31  -1.45  -0.36 -0.10 -3.58 -2.93 
Malta  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00    -0.03  0.00 0.00 -2.12  -1.25 -2.61 -0.37 -8.90 -7.25 
Poland -0.09  0.00  -0.19  0.00  0.00  -0.03  0.00   -0.08  -0.03  -0.36  -1.18  -0.43 -0.14 -3.10 -2.68 
Slovakia -0.28  0.00  -1.95 0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.41    -0.06  -0.44  -1.66  -0.56 -0.13 -4.10 -3.69 
Slovenia -0.29 0.00  -0.21 0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01 -0.12  -0.11    -0.57  -1.60  -1.52 -0.17 -5.39 -4.98 
France -0.03  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01 0.00  -0.03  -0.01   -0.75  -0.40 -0.31 -2.57 -2.14 
Germany -0.11 0.00  -0.14  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.02 0.00  -0.13  -0.04  -0.50    -0.34 -0.15 -2.52 -1.98 
Italy -0.03  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02 0.00  -0.04  -0.02  -0.48  -0.76    -0.18 -2.29 -1.99 
Spain -0.02  0.00  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.01  -0.89  -0.83  -0.49   -3.35 -2.87  
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Table 3: Impact of a 20 percent devaluation by one country on Trade Balance, GDP growth and inflation 
(taking into account inflationary impact of devaluation) 
 
Effect on the Trade Balance, GDP Growth (% of GDP) 
Devaluing Country 
Impact on  Hungary  Cyprus  Czech Rep Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania Malta  Poland Slovakia  Slovenia  France Germany Italy  Spain  EU  Euro  Area 
Hungary    -0.07  -0.07  -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.18 -0.17 
Cyprus -0.32    -0.32  -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.33 -0.32 -0.36 -0.35 
Czech  Rep -0.11  -0.10    -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.15 -0.11 -0.11 -0.20 -0.19 
Estonia -0.22  -0.21  -0.22    -0.23 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.22 -0.24 -0.22 -0.22 -0.31 -0.29 
Latvia  -0.21  -0.21  -0.21  -0.22   -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.23 -0.21 -0.21 -0.27 -0.25 
Lithuania  -0.16  -0.16  -0.16  -0.17 -0.17   -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.22 -0.20 
Malta  -0.20  -0.20  -0.20  -0.20 -0.20 -0.20   -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 -0.20 -0.31 -0.29 
Poland -0.12  -0.11  -0.12  -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11   -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.16 -0.15 
Slovakia  -0.21  -0.20  -0.24  -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.21   -0.20 -0.21 -0.23 -0.21 -0.20 -0.26 -0.26 
Slovenia  -0.19  -0.18  -0.19  -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19   -0.19 -0.21 -0.20 -0.19 -0.26 -0.25 
France  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.05  -0.04 
Germany  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03   0.03 0.04 -0.01  0.00 
Italy  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01    0.00 -0.04  -0.03 
Spain  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07   -0.12 -0.12 
                     
Effect on Inflation 
Impact on  Hungary  Cyprus  Czech Rep Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania Malta  Poland Slovakia  Slovenia  France Germany Italy  Spain  EU  Euro  Area 
Hungary    0.00 -0.26  -0.01 0.00  0.00  -0.01 -0.29 -0.21 -0.06 -0.54 -2.72 -0.86 -0.22 -6.36 -5.81 
Cyprus -0.02    -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.37 -0.53 -0.74 -0.29 -4.17 -3.27 
Czech  Rep -0.20  0.00   0.00  0.00  -0.01 0.00  -0.46 -0.66 -0.07 -0.50 -2.96 -0.57 -0.22 -5.99 -5.48 
Estonia -0.09  0.00 -0.14    -0.33 -0.39 0.00  -0.35 -0.03 -0.02 -0.37 -1.58 -0.50 -0.13 -6.96 -5.36 
Latvia  -0.09  0.00 -0.12  -0.56   -0.74 0.00  -0.46 -0.04 -0.02 -0.21 -1.42 -0.34 -0.11 -4.37 -3.43 
Lithuania  -0.09  0.00 -0.13  -0.11 -0.15   0.00  -0.47 -0.02 -0.04 -0.31 -1.45 -0.36 -0.10 -3.58 -2.93 
Malta  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00    -0.03 0.00  0.00  -2.12 -1.25 -2.61 -0.37 -8.90 -7.25 
Poland -0.09  0.00 -0.19  0.00  0.00  -0.03 0.00    -0.08 -0.03 -0.36 -1.18 -0.43 -0.14 -3.10 -2.68 
Slovakia  -0.28  0.00 -1.95  0.00  -0.01 0.00  0.00  -0.41   -0.06 -0.44 -1.66 -0.56 -0.13 -4.10 -3.69 
Slovenia  -0.29  0.00 -0.21  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01 -0.12 -0.11   -0.57 -1.60 -1.52 -0.17 -5.39 -4.98 
France -0.03  0.00 -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01 -0.01 0.00  -0.03 -0.01   -0.75 -0.40 -0.31 -2.57 -2.14 
Germany  -0.11  0.00 -0.14  0.00  0.00  -0.01 -0.02 0.00  -0.13 -0.04 -0.50   -0.34 -0.15 -2.52 -1.98 
Italy  -0.03  0.00 -0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02 0.00  -0.04 -0.02 -0.48 -0.76   -0.18 -2.29 -1.99 
Spain  -0.02  0.00 -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01 0.00  0.00  -0.02 -0.01 -0.89 -0.83 -0.49   -3.35 -2.87 
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Table 4: GDP Growth Correlations (1996-2001) 
 
  CY CZ EE HU  LI  LA MA  PO  SL SLO  EU  Euro  GER  FR  IT 
C Y   1 . 0 0                   
CZ  -0.22  1.00                 
EE  -0.29  -0.08  1.00                
HU  0.73 -0.59  0.28 1.00                      
LI  -0.41  0.07 0.85 -0.04  1.00                    
LA  -0.08  -0.03  0.86 0.41 0.73 1.00                  
MA  -0.02 -0.19 0.20  0.23  -0.18 -0.17 1.00                 
PO  -0.57  -0.36  0.31 -0.16  0.15 -0.14  0.72 1.00              
SL  0.26  -0.43 -0.16 0.46  -0.63 -0.23 0.74  0.39  1.00             
SLO -0.85  0.00 0.54 -0.51  0.74 0.24 0.00 0.61 -0.45  1.00          
EU  0.64 -0.45  0.08 0.78 -0.32  -0.05  0.73 0.21 0.75 -0.50  1.00         
Euro  0.88 -0.13  0.04 0.81 -0.14  0.36 -0.15  -0.68  0.14 -0.76  0.51  1.00      
GER 0.68  -0.29 -0.01 0.71  -0.39 -0.11 0.72  0.12  0.72  -0.59 0.98 0.54 1.00     
FR  0.90  -0.37 -0.16 0.81  -0.43 -0.13 0.40  -0.18 0.55  -0.75 0.90 0.74 0.92  1.00  
IT  0.56 -0.07  0.52 0.80 0.14 0.57 0.39 -0.16 0.35  -0.41 0.71 0.75 0.72  0.66 1.00 
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Table 5: Correlation of Annual Inflation Rates, and Inflation Shocks (1993-2002) 
 
  CY  CZ EE HU LA LI  MA PO SLO  SL Eurozone 
CY  1.00            
CZ  0.44  1.00           
EE  0.53  0.74  1.00          
HU  0.22  0.64  0.60  1.00         
LA  0.50  0.75  0.95  0.52  1.00        
LI  0.46  0.74 0.80 0.31 0.92 1.00          
MA  0.41  0.53 0.53 0.40 0.50 0.46 1.00        
PO 0.55  0.74  0.87  0.79  0.77 0.59 0.59 1.00      
SLO 0.56  0.50  0.57  0.20  0.62 0.72 0.51 0.58 1.00    
SL 0.64  0.70  0.89  0.47  0.81 0.72 0.66 0.89 0.72 1.00  
Eurozone 0.42  0.36  0.58  0.30  0.54 0.50 0.55 0.53 0.48 0.69 1.00 
              
              
  Correlation of Inflation Shocks 1/               
  CY  CZ EE HU LA LI  MA PO SLO  SL Eurozone 
CY  1.00            
CZ  -0.05  1.00           
EE  -0.08  0.02  1.00          
HU  -0.03  0.59  0.09  1.00         
LA  -0.13  0.17  0.31  0.23  1.00        
LI 0.03  -0.11  -0.12  -0.09  -0.22  1.00       
MA  -0.02  -0.16  0.08 0.18 0.15 0.10 1.00        
PO -0.10  0.29  0.10  0.56  0.21 0.05 0.10 1.00      
SLO 0.07  0.56  -0.07  0.60  0.04 -0.20  0.03 0.25 1.00    
SL 0.05  0.37  0.09  0.55  0.21 0.02 0.15 0.37 0.46 1.00  
Eurozone 0.03  0.08  -0.03  0.10  -0.05  -0.03  0.02 0.14 0.18 0.16 1.00 
              
 
1/ Inflation shocks identified through a simple autoregressive model AR(2); for Cyprus and Malta seasonal dummies were used; for the rest of 
the countries a trend was added in the regressions. Based on monthly observations. 
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Table 6: Correlation Coefficients of Shocks to Nominal Effective Exchange Rates (1993-2002) 1/ 
 
  CY CZ EE HU LA  LI  MA PO SLO  SL Euro 
C Y   1 . 0 0              
CZ  0.01  1.00            
EE  0.26  0.03  1.00           
HU  -0.07  0.05  -0.21  1.00          
LA  -0.01  -0.02  0.84  -0.21  1.00         
LI  -0.09 -0.01 0.76  -0.13 0.95  1.00           
MA  -0.30 -0.15 -0.23 -0.22 -0.13 -0.13 1.00         
PO  -0.15  0.22 -0.27  0.26 -0.28  -0.26  0.19 1.00      
SLO -0.05 -0.58 -0.14 0.04  -0.09 -0.11 0.16  -0.01 1.00     
SL  0.35 0.02 0.70 -0.38  0.54 0.46 -0.05  -0.34  -0.09  1.00   
Euro  0.80 0.11 0.56 -0.11  0.26 0.17 -0.48  -0.30  -0.18  0.58  1.00 
 
1/ Based on monthly observations of nominal effective exchange rates. Shocks identified using an AR(2) process; regressions included a 
deterministic trend.  




Table 7. Capital Flows: Candidate Countries, and EU Member States (net flows) 
 
  Level (% of GDP)  Variability (Standard deviation) 
  1997-2001  1990-1996  (unless otherwise indicated) 1/  1997-2001    1990-1996  (unless otherwise indicated) 1/ 
 FDI  Portfolio  Other  Capital  Flows  FDI  Portfolio Other  Capital  Flows  FDI  Portfolio Other Capital Flows    FDI  Portfolio  Other Capital Flows 
Cyprus -0.16 6.64  0.31            1.45  1.39 1.37         
Czech Rep  7.62  -2.03  -0.18            0.43  3.44  1.82         
Estonia 6.10  1.81  1.81            3.45  1.92 2.76         
Hungary 3.43  -0.31  1.72          3.08 4.59  1.65         
Latvia 3.25 2.31  2.29            0.64  3.58  2.87         
Lithuania 7.83  5.62  -1.05            1.43  2.59  1.95         
Malta 10.92  5.10  -11.41            4.13  2.29  4.96        
Poland 4.14  0.39  1.08            7.66  5.29 11.77         
Slovakia 4.37  2.04 0.91          1.03 2.25  0.90         
Slovenia 0.97  4.07 0.89          0.86 1.50  1.67         
Average 4.85  2.56 -0.36           2.42 2.88  3.17         
                           
Denmark 0.70  -3.58 3.38   -0.12 2.62  -3.37   2.62 5.32  1.64    0.63 5.33 5.72 
Germany 0.11  -1.76 1.70   -1.05 1.95  0.42   4.67 3.71  1.71    0.43 2.47 2.79 
France -3.81 -0.28  1.61    -0.55  -0.08  0.27    3.67  2.39 2.45    0.71  2.75  2.45 
Ireland 9.28  -9.89  0.79    1.62  -0.80  -4.92    7.17  8.21 11.34    0.86  3.36  2.59 
Italy -0.38  -0.74  0.41    -0.27  2.09 -1.10    0.41  1.41  1.48    0.15  3.05  3.90 
Netherlands -1.50  -3.58  2.24    -2.15  -1.79  1.50    3.01  4.41  4.43    0.96  1.40  2.59 
Austria  0.82  1.28 0.04   0.08 1.52  -0.03   0.74 1.80  2.55    0.62  2.02 1.60 
Finland -5.11  -1.69  2.06    -0.89  4.02  -1.75    4.24  1.77  3.49    1.30  4.15  4.25 
United 
Kingdom 
-4.21  2.40 2.42   -0.73 -1.66  3.45   4.81 7.74  2.44    1.26  5.05 5.13 
Sweden 1.83  -6.81  4.87    -0.45  -0.21  2.64    8.65  4.43  5.08    2.18  2.14  5.01 
Greece 0.19  6.37  -1.13    1.12    1.42    0.86  1.46 4.65    0.15    0.00 
Spain -2.14  -1.75  4.51    1.18  1.36  -0.38    1.49  1.92  1.61    0.53  3.00  3.82 
Portugal -0.95  0.49 8.19   1.31 0.67  0.46   0.84 1.80  3.00    0.97  1.82 4.55 
Average -0.40  -1.50  2.39   -0.07  0.81  -0.11    3.32 3.57  3.53    0.83  3.05 3.42 
Source: Balance of Payments Statistics, International Monetary Fund; Eurostat. 
 
1/ For Greece 1977-96, Spain, Portugal 1982-1996.  
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Table 8. Interest Rates for Accession Countries and Largest EU Countries. 
 
  Short-term 1/    Long-term  
 2002  2001  2000    2003  2/ 
Cyprus 4.4  5.93  6.44    4.52  3/ 
Czech Rep  3.54  5.17  5.37               3.88     
Estonia 3.38  4.45  4.68    3.52  4/   
Hungary  9.21  10.86  11.39               6.43 
Lithuania 3.74  5.93  8.64    5.00  5/ 
Latvia 3.33  6.05  4.02    4.10  6/ 
Malta 4.01  4.93  4.89    - 
Poland  8.98  16.07  18.77               5.58 
Slovenia 8.73  10.87  10.94    4.32  7/ 
Slovakia  7.77  7.77  8.57              5.00 
          
Euro Area  3.32  4.26      - 
France                     4.13 
Germany                    4.11 
Italy                    4.32 
     
Source: Eurostat; Bloomberg, European Central Bank. 
 
1/ 3-month interest rates. 
      2/ As of 17/03/03; typically 10-year bond yields, national currency, unless otherwise stated. 
3/ Maturity 2/27/2012, euro denominated. 
4/ Maturity 6/26/2007, euro denominated. 
      5/ Maturity 5/10/2012, euro denominated.   
6/ Maturity 11/27/2008, euro denominated. 




    
 